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ABSTRACT 
 On-orbit servicing (OOS) of satellites has been a significant goal since the early 
1980s. Once considered feasible for satellites operating in low earth orbit (LEO) when 
the space shuttle program was operational, providing OOS for satellites operating in 
geostationary orbit (GEO) always has been beyond reach. The advancement of robotics 
and artificial intelligence (AI) has finally opened up the possibility of OOS for all orbital 
regimes. The aim of this thesis is to investigate what has been already proposed for OOS, 
identify the initial satellite subsystems that could benefit from OOS missions, and 
determine whether or not OOS can be made to be cost effective. By tracking and 
categorizing on-orbit satellite failures, a pattern begins to emerge about which 
subsystems are more likely to fail on orbit. From there, subsystem hardware components 
can be identified for potential replacement on legacy satellites and for design 
modification. Proving the ability to service legacy satellites will pave the future of 
satellite design and capability. Ideally, as the technology progresses, all satellites will 
move to a more modular design thus saving money and materials. By using current 
models and cost analysis, the feasibility of OOS can be demonstrated. 
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In the United States, the satellite industry has an estimated value in the billions of 
dollars. In 2016, the U.S. space economy had an estimated value of $158 billion with the 
majority of profits in satellite communications, specifically satellite services and 
manufacturing [1]. In 2018, the global space industry was reported to be worth $414.8 
billion with commercial entities representing 79% of the profits [1]. As demand for space-
based technology and services continues to increase annually, the global space industry is 
expected to grow in the construction, information, and government sectors. As defined by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the space economy covers “the full range of activities 
and the use of resources that create and provide value and benefits to human beings in the 
course of exploring, understanding, managing and utilizing space” [1]. The space industry 
is defined as the “economic activities related to the manufacture and delivery of 
components that go to Earth’s orbit or beyond” [1].  
While the global space industry continues to expand, the possibility of unexpected 
satellite failure continues to be a concern. It is a well-documented fact pertaining to 
different satellite missions that Tech Demonstration platforms are reported to have the 
highest possibility of suffering catastrophic failures, followed by remote sensing and 
communications satellites. In contrast, navigation satellites retain the highest rate of 
success due to having the highest “repeat-in-series” numbers [2]. Satellite failure can be 
caused by any number of issues, ranging from a single subsystem failure that cascades into 
a mission critical failure to complete irreversible satellite damage. A failure is defined as 
“an incident that could lead to permanent or temporary mission degradation” [3]. A mission 
critical failure is when a “premature loss of a satellite or loss of its ability to perform its 
primary mission” before its designated end of life [4].  
When serious satellite damage or failure occurs, related costs can be significant for 
satellite development companies and the insurance companies. Not only is the initial cost 
of satellite construction lost, but any future profits are now null and void. The most recent 
example was the damage of Intelsat 29e, causing a loss of onboard propellant, and resulting 
in a total loss of the satellite [5]. A total loss is when a satellite fails in a way that prevents 
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it from performing the mission or causes it to be “taken out of service due to an anomaly” 
[4]. The Intelsat 29e construction cost was estimated at between $400 and $450 million, 
and this satellite had an expected 15-year operation span [5]. While this initial loss is still 
below Intelsat 2019 second quarter earnings ($509.4 million), over its 15-year economic 
lifespan, Intelsat 29e would have earned a projected profit estimated at $3 billion [6].  
While major corporations such as Intelsat can occasionally afford to absorb losses 
of this magnitude, smaller corporations or government programs have limited capacity to 
do so. This high failure cost is a considerable barrier for any small space program. Although 
insurance companies can help mitigate the price of failure, other options could become 
available to help companies reduce catastrophic losses and satellite failure. 
The new and emerging capability of refueling satellites on-orbit begs the question, 
what other activities could be conducted on-orbit? This study considers the feasibility of 
on-orbit servicing, repair, and upgrade possibilities for satellites currently located in 
geostationary orbit (GEO) to possibly provide scheduled maintenance, reduce costs, and 
insure against risk of failure.  
A. BACKGROUND 
What is on-orbit servicing? On-orbit servicing (OOS) refers to any activity 
conducted in space by a space vehicle on a cooperative client satellite. These activities can 
vary widely depending on the service being offered. Some services that potentially could 
be offered, as defined by the Consortium for Executions of Rendezvous and Servicing 
(CONFERS), are inspection, capture, docking, berthing, relocation, refueling, life 
extension, combined stack control, repair, upgrade, assembly, undocking, unberthing, 
release, and departure [7]. While this newly emerging space activity is largely unregulated, 
CONFERS, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department 
of Defense (DOD), and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) 
are working to create guiding principles [8].  
Current guiding principles for OOS have the space vehicle providing the servicing 
operation designated as the servicer and the space vehicle receiving the service as the client 
satellite [7]. Going forward, commercial OOS will be conducted between two consenting 
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parties in a responsible and transparent manner to promote trust and confidence in the 
servicer.  
There are two types of clients currently defined in OOS operations: cooperative and 
non-cooperative clients. A cooperative client is defined as a fully functional satellite that 
can place itself into a mutually beneficial orbit for both the client and servicer [7]. A 
cooperative client can aid the servicer in its attempts to rendezvous with the client. For 
example, a cooperative client can maneuver their satellite into a more favorable orbit to 
receive the servicer. A non-cooperative client is a satellite that for either known or 
unknown reasons cannot control its flight or cooperate with the servicer in any way [8]. 
Most legacy satellites are designated as non-cooperative, since most satellites are not yet 
built upon specifications to readily receive servicers. As the capability to service satellites 
improves, it is possible to look to future designs with built in features to receive servicer 
satellites. 
B. HISTORY OF ON-ORBIT SERVICING 
The concept and design of on-orbit servicing is not new. Since the beginning of 
mankind’s first substantial foray into space, the concept of being able to fix, correct, or 
update space objects has been thoroughly discussed. Historically, the majority of these 
studies were focused on the International Space Station (ISS) and the space shuttle as 
potential platforms through which to conduct the servicing [9]. Before the prevalence of 
advanced robotics, any servicing missions, such as the Palapa B2 and Westar 6 salvage 
missions in 1984, and the numerous Hubble servicing missions from 1993 to 2009, were 
done by astronauts [10]. With the loss of the space shuttle program, however, it seemed 
that the ability to conduct on-orbit servicing too would be lost. However, with the new 
advancements in robotics and artificial intelligence (AI), OOS has become plausible 
allowing for corrections of satellite failures, or extending satellite services while on-orbit. 
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C. CURRENT ON-ORBIT SERVICING PROJECTS 
Before April 2, 2020, OOS was still a technological concept. Northrup Grumman’s 
Mission Extension Vehicle (MEV) has now proven that it is a possibility. The MEV-1 is 
designed to perform rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) with the client satellite 
and provide propulsion and attitude control to extend service life [11]. As of February 25, 
2020, MEV-1 had docked with Intelsat IS-901 and proceeded to provide services. By April 
2, 2020, Intelsat’s IS-901 was returned to active duty [12]. MEV-1 demonstrated that OOS 
can provide life extension to defunct satellites. MEV-1 will provide an extra five years of 
propulsion and attitude control to IS-901 [13]. This event is just the tip of the iceberg for 
all the future possibilities OOS missions can provide. 
D. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
As Northrup Grumman has now demonstrated, it is possible to conduct safe RPO 
with legacy satellites in order to provide life extensions services on-orbit. It bears further 
investigation into this new satellite mission area to further explore the potential capabilities 
of OOS missions.  
This thesis will examine the different services that OOS spacecraft can provide at 
GEO. It will delve into the feasibility of developing an open standard that will enable 
commercial satellite developers to benefit from on-orbit servicing capabilities. The focus 
will be on identifying high failure components in each subsystem, ease of on-orbit 
replacement, and potential standardization of each subsystem. The goal will be to first 
identify the most profitable subsystems for OOS and how to start implementing modular 
design into those subsystems. The focus will be on current satellites in geosynchronous 
(GEO) orbit, how these legacy satellites can be serviced, while investigating which 
components across all platforms could be initially serviced and what needs to be changed 
to a modular design as an industry standard. 
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II. IDENTIFICATION OF HIGH FAILURE COMPONENTS 
IN GEO SATELLITES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 2000s, several studies have been undertaken to study on-orbit 
satellite failures in order to identify and quantify different reasons behind satellite failure. 
Identifying when satellites fail and what components have failed can build the basis to start 
incorporating design modularity and on-orbit serving capabilities. In this chapter, several 
studies have been incorporated to gain an overarching view on which components have the 
highest failure rates and the level to which these failures contribute to total mission loss. 
These data have been broken down and arranged into the major satellite subsystems to 
highlight which subsystems would benefit the most from an on-orbit replacement 
capability. 
By analyzing satellite failure data from 1980 to 2018, the majority of satellite 
failures can be attributed to either electrical or mechanical failure. As seen in Figure 1, 
45% of all satellite failures were electrical in nature, while 32% were mechanical failures 
[3]. Combined, these two factors make up more than 75% of all satellite failures. 
 
Figure 1. Spacecraft Failure Type. Source: [3]. 
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Satellite failures were further broken down into which subsystems experienced the 
most failures. As seen in Figure 2, Attitude and Orbital Control System (AOCS) and Power 
accounted for more than half of the anomalies in a study done by the Canadian Space 
Agency (CSA) [3]. While it would seem that the AOCS failures would account for the high 
percentage of electrical failures in Figure 1, the majority of AOCS failure are mechanical 
[3]. The Power subsystems conversely, suffers more from electrical failures than 
mechanical failures due to the nature of its hardware composition. The exception is the 
solar array (SA) failures as seen in Figure 3, which are a combination of mechanical and 
electrical faults [3]. 
 
Study done from 1980 to 2005 identified 156 satellite failures on 129 civilian and military 
spacecraft. 
Figure 2. Spacecraft Subsystems Affected. Source: [3]. 
Further reduction is necessary to identify the particular components in each 
subsystem that failed. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of satellite component failures. 
Solar arrays, batteries, the power bus, and power circuitry all fall under the Power 
subsystem [3]. The AOCS counts the control motion gyroscopes (CMG), control processor, 
GPS, gyroscopes, reaction wheels, momentum wheel, thrusters, and tracking instruments 
as part of its hardware components [3]. 
Figure 3. Spacecraft Component Failures: Source: [3]. 
Additional analysis of satellite failures over time indicates that 40% of all failures 
were considered a total loss and 65% of all failures caused significant mission degradations 
[3]. By considering all the different subsystems and the common failures associated with 
their respective hardware components, determinations can be made about which 
subsystems and components could benefit from OOS capabilities.  
B. TELEMETRY, TRACKING, AND COMMAND (TT&C) SYSTEM
FAILURE ANALYSIS
The telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) subsystem is responsible for
communication and radiometric tracking between the satellite and its respective ground 
stations [4]. Radiometric tracking uses the Doppler shift and ranging signal in a spacecraft 
(SC) downlink signal to measure the SC earth-relative velocity and distance to calculate 
the SC position relative to the Earth [4]. The TT&C subsystem allows the SC to receive 
commands from the ground station via its uplink radio signal and send telemetry and 
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mission data to the ground station via its downlink radio signal. Hardware components 
included in the TT&C subsystem are antennas, transponders/transceivers, power 
amplifiers, radio frequency (RF) network, and wideband transmitters [4].  
The TT&C subsystem sees the smallest percentage of failures. As seen in Figure 2, 
only 12% of all satellite breakdowns fall into this category [3]. This small percentage is 
most likely due to the robust nature of this system and built in redundancies. The majority 
of failures in this category caused temporary mission degradation as opposed to mission 
failure [3]. The industry standard is to also have an “emergency mode recovery” where at 
least two antennas are designed to be always pointing at the ground station in-case of 
communication anomalies, thus allowing the ground station to maintain constant 
communication with the SC to troubleshoot any anomaly [4]. These low failure rates speak 
to the success of the redundancies present in this subsystem. The largest percentage of 
failures that do occur are attributed to electrical component failure, any software failures 
have been attributed to human error [1].  
C. COMMAND AND DATA HANDLING (C&DH) SYSTEM FAILURE 
ANALYSIS 
The command and data handling (C&DH) subsystem is responsible for the on-
board data processing for the SC. This subsystem incorporates the central processors, 
system management software, control system software, payload management software, and 
fault detection software [4]. 
The C&DH subsystem sees about 15% of all satellite failures, as depicted in Figure 
2. While the percentage of system anomalies due to a C&DH failure are low, it can have 
devastating effects on the satellites mission capability and completion. Approximately 56% 
of all CDH anomalies lead to a total satellite loss. This can happen due a failure in the 
primary processor, in the electrical connection between the two processors, or a cascading 
failure in both the primary and secondary processor [3]. Since most satellites have primary 
and secondary processors designed to high software and hardware standards, the failure 
rate trends on the lower side.  
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D. STRUCTURES AND MECHANISMS SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS 
The structures and mechanisms subsystem consists of the physical SC structure, 
thermal protection, docking mechanism, and tether [4]. The CSA study included the 
payload instrument within this section; however, for this study, it will be broken out into 
the next section, II.E, due to the large percentage of failures in that category.  
As seen in Figure 4, most of the satellite failures for this subsystem are caused by 
an anomaly with the payload instrument. The majority of failures in this category occur 
within the first year of operation and are of a mechanical nature; the rest of the anomalies 
are attributed to the space environment [3]. The CSA’s study concluded that when the 
structural and mechanical subsystem suffered an anomaly, approximately 75% of the time 
it leads to mission failure [3].  
 
Figure 4. Failure Impact and Mechanical Component Failure: Source: [3]. 
E. PAYLOAD SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS 
While some satellite payloads are developed in limited numbers, other payloads are 
allocated as a part of a larger series. Navigation and communications satellites are often 
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built to be a part of large, global constellations. This is necessary to maintain global 
coverage as well as reducing the production cost of a single satellite.  
Navigation and communication missions see the most robust payloads, due to the 
high series number produced for each constellation, reducing the potential for parts failure 
[14]. As seen in Figure 5, technological demonstration satellites have the lowest success 
rate simply due to the fact that they are often demonstrating unproven technology.  
 
This graphic only depicts satellite data from 1980 to Dec 31, 2018, unclassified data only 
from only U.S. military and civilian satellites in GEO. 
Figure 5. Rate of Satellite Success by Payload Type: Source: [14]. 
While not all payload types could benefit from on-orbit servicing capabilities, there 
is potential for satellites in large series to benefit from on-orbit servicing.  
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1. Communications Payloads 
Communications payloads at GEO allow for continuous coverage over a fixed 
region on earth. Depending on the company and the demand for service they are trying to 
fill a communication constellation can contain anywhere from 3 to 30+ satellites as seen in 
the Eutelsat constellation [15]. Standard to a communication mission is the antenna 
package tailored to the specific frequencies used by that satellite. Any type of servicing 
done on a communication payload would have to take into account the specific antenna 
design. 
2. Remote Sensing Payloads 
Remote sensing payloads can be divided into two main categories based on how 
they are receiving and interpreting data. The first category being passive collection, where 
the SC collects the emissions it can pick up passively with its own sensors and does not 
rely on any active emissions by the SC instruments. If the SC instrument is measuring 
direct or reflected radiation it is considered a passive sensor [4]. Passive collection can be 
done by collecting solar reflectance, microwave radiation, X-ray radiation and gamma-ray 
radiation [4]. Examples of passive payloads are GeoEye and DigitalGlobe observation 
satellites or the U.S. DOD Special Sensor Microwave Imager Sounder (SSMIS) [4].  
The second category is active collection, where the SC uses its own energy output 
to collect data like radar or LIDAR [4]. Active collections can be done with radar, LIDAR, 
scatterometer, laser altimeter, or sounder [16]. Examples of active sensor payloads are 
DLR’s TerraSAR-x or the Global Ecosystem Dynamics Investigation (GEDI) on the ISS 
[16]. 
The precise calibration and instrument sensitivity required for each sensor on an 
observational payload makes it a difficult candidate for on-orbit repair. However, these 
satellites could potentially benefit from receiving on-obit upgrades 
3. Technology Demonstration Payloads 
Technology Demonstration Missions (TDM) due to the nature of their mission are 
not planned for an extended design life (DL). The average DL for a tech demo satellite is 
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approximately 1–2 years. As seen in Figure 6, since 1980 the DL for TDM satellites has 
remained constant and as such does not make it a good candidate for an OOS mission.  
 
Figure 6. Design Life by Function: Source: [2]. 
F. POWER SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS 
The Electrical Power System (EPS) provides, stores, regulates and distributes 
power to all other subsystems on the SC, without the EPS nothing will function [4]. For 
GEO satellites the power system accounts for roughly one-third of the entire spacecraft dry 
mass [4]. This subsystem is made up of four basic EPS groups; energy storage, power 
regulation and control, power distribution, and the power source [4]. Energy storage 
hardware is primarily composed of batteries, super-capacitors, fuel cells, and flywheels [4]. 
Standard aerospace batteries types and designations are shown in Figure 7.  
13 
 
Figure 7. Aerospace Battery Types: Source: [4]. 
Power regulation and control are required to maintain a steady flow of power to 
each subsystem without allowing for an overcharge or negative current flow. The most 
common power source for satellites is solar photovoltaics, which are traditionally arranged 
on a panel and built into arrays. The size and shape of the array depends on the power 
requirement for each satellite mission.  
From 1980 to 2019, EPS failures accounted for at least 80 documented satellite 
anomalies [2], [11]. As seen in Figure 2, from 1980 to 2005 approximately 34 satellites 
suffered from a significant EPS anomaly. The majority of the EPS failures were due to 
electrical malfunction (67%), and occurred during the first year of operation, 45% of all 
failures were critical to the satellite resulting in a loss of mission [1]. The majority of these 
failures can be attributed to solar array failures. 
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Further breaking the EPS down into its component parts from Figure 8, solar arrays 
(SA) account for 49% of all power systems failures, followed by battery failures 
constituting 22%, making both an ideal candidate to receive OOS.  
 
Figure 8. Failure Impact and Component Failure for Power Subsystem: Source: [3]. 
A more recent study, conducted from 2000 to 2019, on Axa XL insured satellites 
at GEO indicates at least 41 satellites were lost due to EPS failures [17]. Similar to the 
previous study solar arrays account for the majority of the anomalies. Figure 9 shows the 
accumulation of data from the AXA XL insurance study. 
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Figure 9. Satellite Failures from 2000 to 2019 at GEO: Source: [17]. 
A solar array can fail for numerous reasons. It can fail to deploy properly, in which 
case it can be counted as a SA mechanical failure, or due to the space environment it can 
experience arcing causing short-circuiting [3]. Solar arrays are also extremely prone to 
failure within the first year of life, 55% of SA failures will happen during the first year 
of life, generally during flight check-out [3]. The large failure rate experience by both 
SA and batteries make both good candidates to examine further for OOS possibilities. 
Also, over time the solar arrays will decrease in efficiency due to darkening caused by 
the space environment, which makes this system a potential candidate for a midlife 
servicing mission.  
G. CONTROL SYSTEMS FAILURE ANALYSIS 
The attitude and orbit control system (AOCS) is broken down into two subsystems; 
“the attitude determination and control system (ADCS) and the guidance, navigation, and 
control (GN&C)” [3]. The ADCS stabilizes the SC and corrects the orientation to the 
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correct attitude per the mission requirements [3]. The GN&C system determines the 
satellites position and velocity. The AOCS is made up of actuators and sensors 
that are used by both subsystems. Actuators are used to maintain orbit and provide mission 
necessary attitude adjustments. Actuators can be any combination of reaction wheels, 
momentum wheels, control moment gyros (CMG), magnetic torquers, and thrusters 
[4]. Sensors are used for calculating SC attitude and position, and can be any combination 
of sun sensors, gyroscopes, star sensors, horizon sensors, magnetometer, and 
GPS receivers [4] . 
The AOCS caries the brunt of satellite failures on-orbit. These failures account for 
32% of all system failures, as shown in Figure 10. Breaking the AOCS into different failure 
categories, in Figure 10, 54% of AOCS failures are mechanical, 20% are related to an 
electrical failure, an additional 20% are seen due to a software failure, and the last 6% are 
due to an unknown failure [1]. Mechanical components consist of the CMG, momentum 
wheels, gyroscopes, reaction wheels, and thrusters.  
 
Figure 10. AOCS Failure Type: Source: [3]. 
Further analysis of specific component failure identifies gyroscopes, momentum 
wheels, and thrusters as the main culprits of a majority of AOCS failures (Figure 11).  
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Figure 11. Failure Impact and Component Failure for AOCS: Source: [3]. 
In a study done by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center from 1990–2001into 
strictly guidance, navigation and control system failures, the leading causes of failure in 
GN&C were attributed to hardware and design problems. As seen in Figure 12, hardware 
failures were the cause of 45% of all GN&C failures in satellites [18].  
 
Figure 12. GN&C Anomalies vs. Cause Category: Source: [18]. 
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The study goes on to conclude in Figure 13, which hardware has historically caused 
the most failures in the GN&C. Reaction wheels hold the leading cause of failures in 
GN&C hardware followed by pyrovalves [18]. Reaction wheel failure can be caused by a 
myriad of reasons; however, the leading cause is due to fatigue or overstress of said wheels. 
With the proper adjustments to satellite construction it may be possible for these high 
failure rate items to be replaced. Pyrovalves failures, due to their single use design are most 
commonly either due to a firing caused by human error or a pre-existing design flaw [19]. 
 
Figure 13. GN&C Anomalies vs. Equipment Type: Source: [18]. 
H. TIMELINE OF SATELLITE FAILURES 
Not only is it important to know what subsystems are most likely to experience 
failures, but when in their design life they can be expected to fail. The majority of satellites 
have the potential to experience what is called infant mortality, where the spacecraft’s 
actual life is less than 10% of its design life [18]. This infant mortality is caused by the 
aforementioned multitude of system anomalies. However, if a satellite manages to make it 
past the first three years of its operational life, it will more than likely survive past its 
original design life [3].  
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In a study done by Aerospace Corporation in 2019, it was discovered that 20% of 
satellites launched failed to meet design-life expectations [14]. However, that data does not 
indicate when in the design lifetime that the satellite failed. Further investigation shows 
that 41% of satellites failures occur within the satellites first operational year [3]. After that 
the failure rate is roughly even as seen in Figure 14, with a 17% failure rate between years 
1 and 3, a 20% failure rate during years 3 through 5, and from years 5 through 8 a 16% 
failure rate [3]. 
 
Figure 14. Time of Failure After Launch: Source: [3]. 
Some subsystems are especially vulnerable to this infant mortality, 56% of all 
GN&C anomalies occur within the first 10% of mission life, as seen in Figure 15 [18].  
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Figure 15. Anomaly Occurrence in Satellite Design Life: Source: [18]. 
The rate of infant mortality decreases as design life increases as seen in Figure 16 
[2]. The majority of satellite failures within the first year belong to satellites with a design 
life of 5 years or less [2]. This high failure rate can be attributed to the lack of robust testing 
and hardened components included in this category of satellite [17]. While designing a 
more reliable component or adding redundancy to the satellite would decrease the failure 
rate it would also exponentially increase the cost of the satellite.  
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Figure 16. Satellite Reliability by Design Life Range: Source: [2]. 
For satellites with a design life of 8 to 11 years, 3.6% will suffer from infant 
mortality [2]. As seen in Figure 17, it is more common for a satellite failure to occur in the 
first year of operation. However, as the satellite ages the failure rate does decrease but it 
does not vanish entirely. Satellites that suffered from infant mortality would be the ideal 
category to begin initial on-orbit servicing test. 
 
Figure 17. Satellite Anomalies and Losses vs. Age: Source: [17].  
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There are two types of satellite anomalies that do not follow this pattern and occur 
within the first year of satellite design life. Propulsion failure and central processor 
anomalies tend to fall outside the infant mortality timeline. For propulsion failures, 50% of 
the failures will occur within year 1 to 4 of design life, but can continue to happen up to 
year 10 of design life [20]. Central processor failures tend to begin after year 6 of 
operational life, and they will continue to fail up to year 8 or 9 or operational life [21]. 
Figure 18 indicates the year and percentage of anomaly occurrence broken down 
by subsystem. The subsystems most grievously affected still follow the similar pattern 
established earlier in this chapter. The AOCS and EPS systems, despite design 
improvements within the last 25 years, are still prone to a large percentage of system 
anomalies. These critical subsystems are prime candidates to benefit from on-orbit 
servicing.  
 
Figure 18. Annual Anomalies by Type of Claim: Source: [21]. 
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III. SATELLITE MODIFICATIONS TO FACILITATE 
ON-ORBIT SERVICING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Servicing satellites on orbit is a notoriously difficult challenge that has been 
discussed and researched since the early 1980s. Many satellites in orbit today that could 
benefit from on-orbit servicing fall into the category of non-cooperative satellites, mostly 
due to a lack of design to allow for servicing. However legacy satellites and satellites 
undergoing construction can both benefit from future servicing options. Some 
modifications can be made with only a low cost and minor design change, while other 
modifications will need to be delineated to future designs [22]. By starting with the little 
steps now, it will pave a future path for more sophisticated servicing options. The ultimate 
goal being the ability to upgrade old satellites with new technology and significantly 
cutting the cost to satellite construction.  
There are six core reasons to invest in on orbit servicing technology: reduction of 
life cycle expenses, increased payload capability, extended orbital lifetimes, increased 
spacecraft capabilities, enhanced mission and operational flexibility, and increased pre-
launched spacecraft flexibility [9]. OOS will help reduce satellite life cycle cost and help 
increase payload sensor availability [9]. It will extend spacecraft orbital lifetimes, 
capabilities, and mission flexibility and readiness [9]. Additionally, OOS can enable more 
last-minute flexibility and operational readiness in the pre-launch spacecraft, especially if 
that spacecraft has been built upon a modular design, allowing for potential payload change 
out before launch [9].  
To provide the most economical option it is ideal if the satellite servicer can provide 
multiple services to multiple satellites. To facilitate this idea a proposed servicer design is 
the Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) [23]. Historically the ORU was used first in the 1993 
mission to service the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) and was used as a blanket term for 
any part that had to be replaced on orbit [23]. For servicing legacy satellites and satellites 
that have not been specifically designed to be modular or serviced, an ORU could be 
docked to the client satellite by a servicer satellite with the needed repair components 
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inside. Without implementing a modular design “approximately one-third of all satellite 
components can be practically replaced” [9].  
Before servicing a satellite, fault identification on the client satellite is critical. By 
identifying either the exact nature of the fault or the piece of hardware associated with it, 
precise calibrations can be done for the repair parts [9]. System operators will need to 
prepare for satellite downtime during repairs and have the satellite enter into a safe mode 
for servicing operations. System engineers will need to verify that the ORU will not 
interfere with the client satellites thermal control and will operate within the power margins 
of the host satellite [9]. 
B. RENDEZVOUS AND DELIVERY VEHICLE 
The rendezvous and delivery (R/D) vehicle is the first part need to facilitate OOS 
operations. In order to service multiple satellites, the R/D vehicle will need to carry at 
minimum 2 ORU, enough fuel to complete its mission, and the tools to install the ORU 
onto the client satellite [9].  
Ideally due to transmission delays the R/D vehicle would be able to conduct RPO 
and OOS operations in a fully automated mode with a manual safety override feature for 
emergencies [9], [22]. Figure 19 demonstrates one concept of the R/D vehicle design to 
service multiple satellites. Each replacement component would be an ORU designed to 
repair a specific satellite. As future satellite design trends tend toward a more modular 
system the ORU can also become a standardized model easily replacing common failed 
parts.  
Several methods can be used to attach the ORU to the client satellite, however, for 
legacy satellites since they were not designed for servicing, the easiest method would be to 
attach the ORU to the Marman ring. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) Tactical Technology Office has developed a prototype Marman Ring Tool 
(MRT) to assist in attaching to the client satellite body [23]. Figure 20 demonstrates how 




Figure 19. R/D Servicer and Module Configuration: Source: [9]. 
 
Figure 20. DARPA Prototype Marman Ring Tool CAD Demonstration: 
Source: [23]. 
Figure 21 shows the constructed MRT prototype displaying the outer diameter 
(OD) jaw and inner diameter (ID) jaws used to attach to the client satellite’s Marman ring. 
Once the R/D Vehicle has docked with the client satellite the ORU will need to be 
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connected into the client’s bus to interface with the subsystems it will be replacing. Seen 
in Figure 22 is a notional example of how the ORU could interface with the client satellite, 
as demonstrated with the 1553 bus; however, the concept can be applied to multiple bus 
structures as long as the ability to interface with the client satellite and isolate the broken 
component is present [9].  
 
Figure 21. DARPA Prototype Marman Ring Tool: Source: [23]. 
 
Figure 22. Wire Routing to the Docking Interface Enables Functional Replacement 
of a Component: Source: [9]. 
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As satellite designs switch to a more modular architecture similar to Figure 23, the 
ability to conduct OOS with a standard ORU will become more common place.  
 
Figure 23. Typical Data Architecture and Modular Data Architecture: Source: [9]. 
While the R/D vehicle will be a new construction, there are many modifications 
that can be made to the external structure and internal subsystems on the potential client 
satellites without a significant design change or increase in cost. Most of these 
modifications would be superficial additions to the outer structure of the spacecraft and 
would aid in RPO for the client satellite [9]. 
C. STRUCTURES AND MECHANISMS 
To promote safer RPO the following modifications in Table 1 could be 
implemented. They range from low cost exterior only modifications to the high cost 
modifications associated with design changes. The low-cost exterior additions could be 
implemented while the satellite is still on the production floor [22]. The majority of the 
changes in Table 1 in the left side column can be implemented without the need for 
additional testing or qualifications. The modifications postulated in the middle column in 
Table 1 will need be run through the same qualifying test as the rest of the spacecraft’s 
components to make sure they are radiation hardened and can survive the space 
environment. The final column will require major changes in the satellite design and will 
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need to be implemented during the initial design phase [22]. The first push to making a 
satellite serviceable should focus on implementing the service aids that cost little and add 
little extra mass, for example taking closeout photos and dimensions of the final structure 
could pay dividends when it comes time to service the satellite in orbit [22].  
Table 1. Structure Modifications to Promote Safer Rendezvous and Proximity 
Operations. Adapted from [22]. 
Level of Spacecraft Bus Modifications 
Low Cost: Exterior 
Additions 
Medium Cost: Minor 
Modifications 
High Cost: Redesign 
and Design Changes 
Add optical/reflective target 




range targeting by the RPO 
sensors 
Add Omni-directional, 
low-power RF beacons 
Leave optical positioning 
aids used on the ground in 
place 
Add solar-powered LED 
beacons to aft end of the 
satellite 
Add external status 
indicators to visually 
indicate spacecraft 
readiness for capture 
Take closeout photos using 
LIDAR or IR imaging 
Add truncated-cone 
navigation aid (to provide 
pitch and yaw information) 
Add RF crosslinks that 
can provide ranging 
information 
Take additional closeout 
photos of aft end of 
spacecraft at launch site with 
servicing in mind 
Install specific servicing 
sensors with telemetry 
(thermocouple on the fill-
and-drain valve [FDV] 
mounting plate) 
Add aperture door to 
sensitive optics to 
prevent contamination 
during servicing 
Document dimensions of 
flight ready systems (with 
blankets in place, etc.) 
  
Provide network access to 




To facilitate ease of capture of the client satellite by the R/D vehicle the 
modifications listed below in Table 2 could be implemented. New technology designed 
and demonstrated by DARPA includes the Marman ring capture tool seen in Figure 21  
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which can grapple with 1194, 937, and 1666 Marman rings. Also in the current design 
process with OOS in mind, is the development of the FREND MKII robotic arm system 
(RAS) and the Payload Orbital Delivery (POD) module which work together to complete 
the Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites (RSGS) project [23].  
Table 2. Structure Modifications to Increase Ease of Capture by R/D Vehicle. 
Adapted from [22]. 
Level of Spacecraft Bus Modifications 
Low Cost: Exterior 
Additions 
Medium Cost: Minor 
Modifications 
High Cost: Redesign and 
Design Changes 
Add reference markings 
around the Marman ring 
(i.e., clock-face tic marks) 
Standardize Marman ring 
for capture  
(DARPA’s current 
prototype can grapple 
1194, 937, and 1666 
Marman rings [23]) 
Add grapple features on 
the spacecraft bus aft end 
Standardize blanket 
dressing around Marman 
ring (i.e., trim existing 
blankets to fit) 
Add external grounding 
point to equalize electrical 
potential between 
spacecraft 
Add standardized docking 
features 
Take additional closeout 
pictures of Marman ring 
(and surrounding area) at 
launch site 
Analyze deployables to 
accommodate on-orbit 
loads (thermal and 
mechanical) 
Design deployables to 
accommodate on-orbit 
loads (thermal and 
mechanical) 
 
To assist in on-orbit satellite repairs the following modifications in Table 3 can be 
implemented to the client satellites structure. The most focus being paid to the thermal 
blankets that traditionally are taped onto the satellite at the end of the build process. By 
strategically changing some of the adhesive from tape to Velcro it will be possible to still 
provide the thermal protection required while allowing for easy and repeatable access to 
the client satellite [22].  
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Table 3. Structure Modifications to Facilitate Repairs to Satellites. 
Adapted from [22]. 
Level of Spacecraft Bus Modifications 
Low Cost: Exterior 
Additions 
Medium Cost: Minor 
Modifications 
High Cost: Redesign 
and Design Changes 
Close thermal blankets 
with Velcro instead of 
tape 
Add external cameras to 
observe all deployments in 




overdrive feature (hex 
drive) 
Add Velcro to back of all 
existing thermal blanket 
flaps to hold open when 
repairs are being 
conducted 
Design thermal blanket flaps 
(with Velcro on back) for all 
external interfaces 
Incorporate modular 
design for unit 
replacement (similar to 
what was done on the 
HST [10]) 
Provide loops on thermal 
blanket edges to facilitate 
manipulation with robotic 
arm 
Add external connector that 
provides access to major 
spacecraft bus systems 
Add external ORU 
interface with power and 
data connections 
Add thermal blanket flaps 
over existing ground test 
ports 
Position ground test ports at 
aft end (or in an area that a 
robotic are can easily reach) 
Combine mechanical and 
electrical connectors 
(blind mates) 
Add external labels that 
identify location of 
ground test ports 
  
 
The structural modification suggestions in this section are just the tip of the iceberg, 
meant to be a launching point to begin transitioning satellite design to a modular construct 
that enables and promotes mission and design flexibility.  
D. PAYLOAD MODIFICATIONS 
Besides modifications to the exterior structure of the bus, other modifications can 
be added to the satellites payload components to allow for repairs and upgrades. While 
most payload modifications to incorporate modular design would have to be incorporated 
at the start of the design process, some modifications can be still made on the production 
floor without significant extra cost depending on the mission set. For example, the direct 
downlink (D/L) is critical to communication missions, if this fails it will be catastrophic to 
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the satellites ability to function. To facilitate the direct downlink (D/L) becoming a 
repairable item a visible label should be added to the exterior of the spacecraft so that the 
D/L can be identified during OOS [9]. Future modifications could include designing 
modular payload sets that could be built into ORU and replaced on-orbit as needed for 
updates or repair [24]. DARPA’s RSGS project includes a prototype ORU specifically for 
adding a new payload upgrade called the Payload Orbital Delivery (POD) system [23]. It 
was flight proven in 2018 as an On-orbit attachable capability (OAC) where it is launched 
into space as a ride along on a host satellite via the POD system. Once released by the host, 
the OAC will then be retrieved by the RSGS to be installed on a client satellite, as seen in 
Figure 24.  
 
Figure 24. OAC Enable Space Architecture Adaptability: 
Source: [23]. 
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E. POWER SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS  
The electrical power system (EPS) over the last couple of decades has seen a total 
failure rate of 27% as seen in Figure 2, and since 2000 has accounted for at least 80 total 
mission failures (Figure 9) [3], [17]. The main hardware components that failed before 
EOL are solar arrays and batteries, and both parts could see benefits from OOS and repairs 
[3]. Minimal cost modifications can include keeping the power test port available 
externally and adding the Velcro adhesive to allow for easy access on-orbit [9]. Mid-cost 
modifications could include reconfiguring the solar array connection to optimize for 
attachment and removal via a robotic tool and designing an ORU with spare batteries to 
interface with the client satellite [24]. Major modifications would include the redesign of 
the power distribution unit (PDU) and battery configurations.  
Again a redesign to include a design similar to what was seen on the HST repair 
missions (Figure 25) could also be used to promote OOS operations [9], [24].  
 
Installation of the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR) on 
the HST. The modular instruments were designed to be replaced on-orbit by astronauts 
from the ISS using the space shuttle.  
Figure 25. HST First Servicing Mission: COSTAR Installation: Source: [24]. 
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F. ATTITUDE AND ORBIT CONTROL MODIFICATIONS 
The AOCS anomalies on-orbit account for 32% of all on-orbit anomalies and 
account for the majority of all satellite mission losses. Unlike the previous section, adding 
modifications to the AOCS will require a varying degree of minor to major design 
modifications to truly become a modular system on a spacecraft.  
The change proposed by Table 4 in the left side column can be implemented 
without the need for additional testing or qualifications. Any inertial reference unit (IRU) 
that needed replacement could be replaced with a new IRU inside an ORU [23]. The 
modifications postulated in the middle column in Table 4 will need to be done in three 
parts, first for legacy satellites modifying the components to work inside an ORU. Secondly 
changing the satellite design so future iterations are modular, and finally run the new 
components through the same qualifying test as the rest of the spacecraft’s components to 
make sure they are radiation hardened and can survive the space environment. The final 
column will require major changes in the satellite design and will need to be implemented 
during the initial design phase [21]. Key to spacecraft servicing will be the design and 
implementation of a spacecraft software “servicing mode” to be implemented before OOS 
is conducted to place the satellite into a safe mode for RPO [24].  
Table 4. Ease of Replacement for AOCS Components. Adapted from [9]. 





Major Design and 
Modifications 
Inertial Reference Unit 
(IRU) 
Three Axis Magnetometer 
Sensor 
Digital Sun Senor 
Electronics 
 Star Tracker Gimbal Control Electronics 
 Reaction Wheels  
 Electromagnetic Torque 
Rods 
 





For the hardware that suffers an anomaly in the AOCS system the repair process 
has the potential to be costly. While some parts can be replaced via an ORU, the more 
fragile electronics may need to wait until modular design has been implemented to repair 
due to their position inside the spacecraft [9]. 
G. PROBLEMS THAT WILL NEED TO BE ADDRESSED 
While adding modifications and redesigning satellite parts will take time and 
money these are easy problems to solve while the satellite is still in the design process or 
even on the production floor compared to the puzzle of correcting on-orbit anomalies. 
Critical to making timely and accurate repairs is the exact knowledge of what has suffered 
a failure on the satellite. Each legacy satellite due to its unique nature will likely require a 
unique solution. For example, to replace an ADCS component, the replacement ORU will 
need to be precisely aligned to the client satellite reference coordinate systems, or allow 
for the new ADCS component to be calibrated while on-orbit [9]. Also, especially for 
repairs on legacy satellites, the ORU’s electrical and attitude control systems will need to 
be designed and calibrated with the enough margin so that the client satellite can support 
the extra load of the ORU or the ORU will need to be designed so it can provide its own 
power [9]. Thermal studies will also need to be conducted so the ORU does not negatively 
affect the client satellite. Ultimately the customer will also need to prepare for adequate 
downtime on the client satellite for the repairs to take place.  
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IV. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ON-ORBIT SERVICING 
VS. SATELLITE REPLACEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Satellite program cost are driven by three main factors; the mass of the satellite, 
complexity, and the project timeline [4]. Increase either the mass or complexity of the 
spacecraft and you will increase the cost. Also, if the project timeline is reduced the satellite 
cost will increase. These three factors have to be taken into careful balance to maintain an 
appropriate budget but still produce a reliable satellite. Currently “space systems are 
designed primarily to have a high parts reliability” but they are still “inherently fragile 
because any failure can lead to major consequences” including but not limited to a loss of 
constellation capacity [4].  
Right now, lower cost missions are classified as a lower risk since less resources 
are wasted in the case of a spacecraft mission loss. To date, satellite companies strive to 
build satellites as cost effective and as reliable as possible. However, satellites still have 
the potential to suffer from major anomalies, and while the design process continues to 
improve there will never be a time any system achieves 100% reliability. Spacecraft, 
especially those at higher orbits, are the only technology that do not benefit from routine 
maintenance and servicing. By filling this technological gap, the satellite industry can 
remodel the way it designs spacecraft to benefit from this cost saving measure.  
B. BASIC COST ASSESSMENT MODEL 
The basic model looks at just the pure price difference between three cases. Case 
one is where the satellite lasts for its entire design life and then is replaced by a new 
satellite. For case one, the total cost (CT) is calculated by taking Ci the cost of a new 
satellite, Cg the cost of launch to GEO, and N as the number of launches needed [25].  
For case one, 
 ( )T i gC N C C= + . [25] (1) 
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This model will give us the cost to insert two satellites into orbit regardless of 
whether the initial satellite failed at end of life or before. This is the “sunk cost” and is the 
current method of satellite operation today [26]. 
The second model is launching the initial satellite and then at EOL time Y 
contracting for a life extension service at cost Cr [25]. The current model for this is 
Northrup Grumman’s MEV-1 that is extending IS-901 lifespan for 5 years [13].  
 T i g rC C C C= + +   [25] (2) 
Further cost Cu will be added to repair/upgrade a satellite on-orbit in conjunction 
with the life extension services giving us Equation 3. 
 T s g r uC C C C C= + + +   [25] (3) 
The cost difference (ΔC) will be calculated by 
 [2( )] [ ]s g s g r uC C C C C C C∆ = + − + + + .  [25] (4) 
If the cost of extending life and repairing/upgrading can be priced in such a way 
that ΔC is significantly less than Equation 1 then OOS can be economically feasible [25]. 
Essentially, if the required servicing costs are less than the cost of a new satellite plus the 
launch to GEO it will be economically viable strategy. 
1. Communication Satellite Example 
While the equations above are a basic model of how to calculate the potential cost 
savings of OOS it does not take into account the potential for on-orbit anomalies that would 
require servicing or replacing the satellite. By taking into account the reliability of a 
satellite a more realistic cost estimate can be used. A communication satellite has an 
average reliability (R(DL)) of 89% and an average design life (DL) of 15 years [2]. If N= 
2 and the statistical average life span is R(DL)*DL, then the expected lifetime (EL), when 
a new replacement satellite is used, can be written as 
 [ ( )* ( )* ] 2 ( )* 2 (15)*15EL R DL DL R DL DL R DL DL R= + = = .  [25] (5) 
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If an OOS system is used instead, where R(DL|r) is the reliability given 
replenishment, then 
 [ ( )* ( | )* ]EL R DL DL R DL r DL= + .   [25] (6) 
For 30 years of service with a replacement satellite, 
 Cost per year = 2( ) / 2 (15)*15s lC C R+ .  [25] (7) 
For 30 years of service with satellite replenishment, 
 Cost per year = ( ) /15*[ (15) (15 | )]s l r uC C C C R R r+ + + + .  [25] (8) 
The goal to making this a feasible option is that the replenishment service needs to 
fulfill one of two factors; make the client satellite “as good as new” and extend the lifetime 
an appreciable amount or be cheap enough to act as a stop gap measure before another 
satellite is launched [25].  
For example, Northrup Grumman’s MEV-1 is currently providing a life extension 
service to IS-901 for $13 million per year for a max of 5 years [13]. Intelsat 901 was in 
operation for 18 years, with an initial design life of 13 years, and other than its lack of 
propellant is still operational [27]. IS-901 cost of construction was $300 million with a 
launch cost of $109 million [28]. In total Intelsat paid ~$474 million for 23 years of satellite 
service. Conversely if they instead chose to replace the satellite with a new spacecraft it 
would have cost them another ~$362 million, including current launch cost aboard a Falcon 
9 rocket, bringing the total for 26 years of design life to ~$771 million [29], [30]. Thus 
saving Intelsat $297 million, which is almost the cost of a new satellite.  
While this is a viable case for a functional satellite that has consumed all onboard 
propellant, what about a satellite that has suffered an anomaly? Unlike the service provided 
by Northrup Grumman the price tag on an ORU and the OOS mission will be a one-time 
fee. If the cost of servicing and parts can be marketed to be 10–20% the cost of a new 
satellite while extending the life span that could be an attractive option. However, this 
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model only takes into consideration the current method of designing satellites for a 10–15-
year design life.  
C. A DIFFERENT APPROACH 
The approach above while demonstrating that OOS has potential, based solely on 
its price tag, it does not take into account the full breadth of options available to the satellite 
industry with an OOS capability. A servicing mission can be compared to an information 
transfer network and evaluated on a cost-per-function (CPF) metric [31]. By using a CPF 
the satellite servicing cost can be compared over its total lifetime cost against different 
factors as a “quantitative measure of cost effectiveness” [31]. The ultimate goal of an 
on-orbit servicing mission is to deliver an ORU to enhance the lifetime and capabilities of 
the spacecraft.  
Using an information transfer network evaluation of OOS mission can be 
determined cost effective if its CPF is less than a traditional approach [31]. OOS can reduce 
the CPF by decreasing the cost of the theoretical first unit (TFU) by reducing the need for 
redundancy and thus reducing the dry mass of a spacecraft. By designing a spacecraft to 
be serviced at the 8, 10, or 13-year mark instead of designing a satellite to survive for 13–
15 years a significant savings can be realized. By comparing the ratio of dry mass of a 
nominal satellite design life (TD) to the dry mass of the planned serviced lifetime (TS), 
where k ≈ 2.75% per year, produces Equation 9 [31]. 
 ( ) / ( ) 1 ( )D S D SM T M T k T T= + −       [31] (9) 
A satellite designed for 15 years has roughly 22% more dry mass than the same 
system designed for 8 years. The cost of the TFU (CTFU) is directly proportional to the dry 
mass of the satellite [4]. 
 / $77,000 /TFU dryC M kg=     [31] (10) 
So, by reducing the dry mass of the satellite by 22%, the CTFU is also reduced by 
22%. This applies across all spacecraft subsystems as well, in Figure 26 the weight of the 
spacecraft bus is directly and linearly proportional to the expense of developing the EPS. 
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This dataset provides the basis for deriving a statistical cost estimating relationship (CER). 
Figure 26. Example of a Development Cost vs. Weight Database: Source: [4]. 
The second reduction of CPF is the change in failure calculations and 
compensations cost [31]. With servicing as an option after a satellite anomaly the cost can 
change from a total loss or reduction in performance to the cost of servicing and repair. 
Currently satellites are notoriously over designed due to the lack of serving options. To 
overcome an anomaly a spacecraft must have built in redundancies or suffer the 
consequences. This overbuild manifest itself not only in cost but also survivability. While 
58% of satellite failures happen in the first 1–3 year, if a satellite does not experience a 
failure it will more than likely exceed its original design life [2], [3].  
Figure 27 illustrates the percentage of satellites that lived past their intended design 
life. At the time of this study 80% of the satellites had reached their design life of >11 
years, however if the majority of recently launched satellites with a planned lifetime of  
> 11 years reach their design life, that number will increase to 96% [2]. By incorporating 




Figure 27. Success Rate by Design Life Range: Source: [2]. 
1. Communication Satellite Example 
Let us use the Intelsat example again. The average Intelsat satellite cost between 
$275 - 400 million, and requires a Falcon 9 class rocket to boost it into GEO costing an 
average of $62 million, and is expected to have a design life of 13–15 years with an average 
life span of 18–20 years [28], [29]. On average in 2019 a communication satellite earned 

















SES Global Luxembourg $2,161.33 50 $43.22 [33] 
Intelsat US $2,061 52 $39.63 [34] 
ViaSat US $684.2 4 $171 [35] 
Eutelsat France $1439.1 37 $38.89 [36] 
SKY Perfect 
JSAT Group 
Japan $963.91 18 $53.55 [37] 
Thaicom Thailand $146.09 8 $18.26 [38] 
Average  $1242.6 28 $60.75  
All prices are in U.S. dollars, any currency conversions were done using data provided by 
Morningstar for Currency and Coinbase for Cryptocurrency [32]. 
 
For the purpose of this example OOS cost was estimated to be $50 million. By 
calculating the cost pro forma for the four different scenarios the cost benefits to on-orbit 
servicing can be seen. Table 6 is the current spacecraft model without the access to any 
OOS missions. With this model around year 7 the initial cost of satellite development and 
launch has been paid off and they rest of the gross revenue earned from the spacecraft is 
pure profit. When a satellite company investigates building a new satellite it looks to gain 
an internal rate of return (IRR) of 15 to 20%, which is achieved around year 11 as shown 
in Table 6 [6]. The IRR is a metric used, to estimate the potential profitability of a new 
investment and to calculate future growth and expansion [39]. It was chosen for this 
scenario as it allows for comparison on an even basis since, in its calculations it omits 
external factor like inflation or cost of capital [39]. For tables 6 through 9 all IRR 
calculations were done using the built-in IRR excel calculator.  
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Table 6. Communication Satellite without Servicing 






0 $0 - $362 - 
1 $60 - $302 - 
2 $60 - $242 - 
3 $60 - $182 - 44.40% 
4 $60 - $122 - 22.00% 
5 $60 - $62 - 8.60% 
6 $60 - $2 - 0.22% 
7 $60 $58 5.26% 
8 $60 $118 9.00% 
9 $60 $178 11.63% 
10 $60 $238 13.52% 
11 $60 $298 14.92% 
12 $60 $358 15.98% 
13 $60 $418 16.78% 
14 $60 $478 17.40% 
15 $60 $538 17.88% 
16 $60 $598 18.26% 
17 $60 $658 18.56% 
18 $60 $718 18.81% 
19 $60 $778 19.00% 
20 $60 $838 19.16% 
All dollars are in millions 
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Table 7. Communications Satellite with Servicing due to 
Mission Loss at Year Two 






0 $0 - $362 - 
1 $60 - $302 - 
2 -$50 - $352 - 
3 $60 - $292 - 63% 
4 $60 - $232 - 36.33% 
5 $60 - $172 - 20.53% 
6 $60 - $112 - 10.59% 
7 $60 - $52 - 4.02% 
8 $60 $8 0.52% 
9 $60 $68 3.76% 
10 $60 $128 6.14% 
11 $60 $188 7.93% 
12 $60 $248 9.30% 
13 $60 $308 10.36% 
14 $60 $368 11.20% 
15 $60 $428 11.87% 
16 $60 $488 12.41% 
17 $60 $548 12.85% 
18 $60 $608 13.21% 
19 $60 $668 13.50% 
20 $60 $728 13.75% 
All dollars are in millions 
 
Table 7 demonstrates the second case where a spacecraft experiences an anomaly 
at year 2 but instead of suffering a total mission loss and being counted as forfeit, it is 
repaired by an OOS mission correcting the anomaly. While ultimately the spacecraft does 
not generate as much revenue as the case in Table 6 without the servicing mission it would 
have been a total loss, this way the satellite is still a viable asset.  
 Table 8 provides an example of the third case where the spacecraft is still designed 
for a 13-year lifespan but has planned for a servicing mission at year 13 which extends the 
spacecraft’s functional life for another 13 years. Profits are still realized at year 7; however, 
the life extension services at year 13 allow for a greater rate of return extending out 
to year 25.  
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Table 8. Communication Satellite with Servicing at Year 13 
Years Gross Revenue 
Cost Coverage 
and Profit 
Internal Rate of 
Return 
0 $0 - $362 - 
1 $60 - $302 - 
2 $60 - $242 - 
3 $60 - $182 - 44.40% 
4 $60 - $122 - 22.00% 
5 $60 - $62 - 8.60% 
6 $60 - $2 - 0.22% 
7 $60 $58 5.26% 
8 $60 $118 9.00% 
9 $60 $178 11.63% 
10 $60 $238 13.52% 
11 $60 $298 14.92% 
12 $60 $358 15.98% 
13 $10 $368 16.12% 
14 $60 $428 16.80% 
15 $60 $488 17.32% 
16 $60 $548 17.74% 
17 $60 $608 18.07% 
18 $60 $668 18.33% 
19 $60 $728 18.54% 
20 $60 $788 18.71% 
21 $60 $848 18.85% 
22 $60 $908 18.96% 
23 $60 $968 19.05% 
24 $60 $1,028 19.12% 
25 $60 $1,088 19.19% 
All dollars are in millions 
 
Table 9 demonstrates an example of the final case presented as a potential with 
OOS missions. In Table 9 the spacecraft is only designed for 8 years reducing the initial 
TFU cost by 20% to $240 million. Due to the reduction in design life the planned servicing 
will now take place at year 8 extending the satellite life to 17 years. Using this design 
generates a final 22.74% rate of return which is greater than all cases presented in Table 6, 
Table 7, and Table 8. Table 9 represents the optimal solution to employ OOS missions. By 
fully incorporating the capabilities that a servicing mission can provide, spacecraft can be 
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designed to less stringent standards saving money and time while seeing a greater rate of 
return.  
Table 9. Communication Satellite Designed for 8 Years with Servicing 
Years Gross Revenue Cost Coverage  and Profit 
Internal Rate of 
Return 
0 $0 - $302 - 
1 $60 - $242 - 
2 $60 - $182 - 
3 $60 - $122 - 36.29% 
4 $60 - $62 - 13.46% 
5 $60 - $2 - 0.33% 
6 $60 $58 7.62% 
7 $60 $118 12.68% 
8 $60 $178 13.31% 
9 $60 $238 16.13% 
10 $60 $298 18.08% 
11 $60 $358 19.44% 
12 $60 $418 20.44% 
13 $10 $428 21.18% 
14 $60 $488 21.74% 
15 $60 $548 22.16% 
16 $60 $608 22.49% 
17 $60 $668 22.74% 
All dollars are in millions 
 
By implementing the full capabilities of an OOS missions into both the profit 
calculations and design considerations it can be shown that CPF of an OOS capable satellite 
is less than that of a traditional approach. Commercial and military satellites can both 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
As demonstrated in the chapters above there is ample opportunity for servicing 
missions for satellites at GEO. From 2000 to now, AXA XL has identified at least 82 
satellites (Table 10) that could benefit from some form of servicing [17]. 
Table 10. GEO Satellites Servicing Opportunities. Adapted from [17]. 
GEO satellites that could benefit from servicing 
Type of Servicing Opportunities Annualized 
Re-Orbit/De-Orbit 17 0.9 
Inspection 59 3.0 
Repair 15 0.8 
Life Extension 30 1.5 
Power Augmentation 39 2.0 
 
82 GEO satellite launched since 2000 have suffered major anomalies 
that could benefit from on-orbit servicing. Some satellites can benefit 
from more than one type of servicing. 
 
The technology to perform these mission is almost ready for commercial use as 
well as seen with both Northrup Grumman’s MEV-1 and DARPA’s RSGS prototype [23], 
[13]. The last remaining step to realizing this technology as a viable commercial service is 
for a company to take the first step and contract with DARPA to be the first example of 
on-orbit repair. Similar to how Intelsat contracted with Northrup Grumman to extend IS-
901’s functional life span a company could choose a satellite that otherwise would be 
counted as a loss for the first demonstration [27].  
Once this first step is taken it no longer becomes a “chicken” and “egg” problem 
but a real and feasible option. It is only the beginning of a wide variety of options available 
once the doors of OOS missions truly open up. As shown in Chapter IV, it is more 
beneficial for a satellite company to design a satellite for 8 years and then pay for a life 
extension servicing at year 8 than it is for a 13–15 design life satellite that may last up to 
18 years. However, what remains to be explored are the follow-on functions that OOS 
could provide. By reducing the need for redundancy in space it could reduce the cost for 
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access to space further opening up a commercial industry and further allowing for more 
economic growth in this sector [25], [40].  
A. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
Further research will be needed to investigate what changes will be required to be 
made into the regulatory laws that govern outer space. Currently there is concern that OOS 
missions could fall under the scrutiny of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR) or the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) [41]. Another concern is the 
imagery that is needed to conduct RPO would potentially need special licensing from 
NOAA [41]. Finally, the need for licensing from the FCC would be another consideration 
any new OOS company would have to take into account [41].  
Another new field would be what the insurance policy could look like for both 
servicer and client satellite. Would insurance companies offer coverage within the first 
three years for GEO satellites that include OOS missions to correct anomalies [41]? 
Could a mobile and flexible servicer become the solution to the issue of orbital 
debris [25]? How much further must the technology progress before companies can look 
to the GEO graveyard orbit for potential salvage missions [42]? Once we get to that point 
how much further is necessary to go until we can assemble satellites in orbit [25]? 
Ultimately OOS is just the first steppingstone to a multitude of future capabilities. 
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